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Highlights
•	 The	study	of	hydropower	regimes	in	European	countries	reveals	the	consid-
erably	variable	 terms	of	hydropower	usage	rights,	 in	 their	 joint	obligations	
and	the	degree	to	which	the	competition	processes	for	granting	these	rights	
is	open.	
•	 The	environmental	and	economic	stakes	and	liabilities,	associated	with	the	
use	of	hydropower,	account	for	the	in-depth	public	controls	in	granting	these	
rights.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 noted	 differences	 among	 hydropower	 regimes	 in	
Europe	cannot	be	explained	by	rational	environmental	or	economic	criteria,	
and	could	 introduce	 competition	distortion	within	 the	European	common	
electricity	market.	
•	 Over	the	last	decade,	the	European	Commission	has	opened	several	infringe-
ment	 procedures	 to	 prompt	 the	 implementation	 of	 competitive	 processes,	
but	they	have	not	been	undertaken	with	a	“Europeanised”	approach,	which	
would	 ensure	 a	 similarity	 of	 efforts	 throughout	 Member	 States	 to	 open	
competition	 to	access	hydropower.	The	current	diversity	amongst	Member	
States	creates	obstacles	for	the	countries	that	have	engaged	in	a	competitive	
renewal	process,	as	they	are	faced	with	the	lack	of	a	level	playing	field	and	a	
coherent	reference	framework.
•	 Thus,	the	fragmented	state	of	European	hydropower	regimes	requires	signifi-
cant	 efforts	 from	 the	 European	 Commission,	 and	 the	 institutional	 stake-
holders,	to	stimulate	harmonisation.	The	actions	of	the	Commission	and	its	
Directorates-General	 must	 be	 coordinated	 and	 delineated,	 and	 new,	 clear	
steps	must	be	taken	to	urge	national	and	regional	authorities	to	harmonise	
their	rules	of	attribution	and	mitigate	competition	distortions.
1.	 This	policy	brief	summarises	the	reasoning	and	the	results	of	the	FSR	research	report:	“Regimes	
for	granting	right	to	use	hydropower	in	Europe”	(2014).
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Background
The	characteristics	of	hydropower	make	it	a	prominent	energy	
source	 in	 liberalised	 electricity	 systems.	 In	 fact,	 hydropower	
provides	widespread	benefits	to	the	entire	power	supply	chain.	
It	 can	 be	 a	 substitute	 for	 any	 other	 generation	 technology	
(either	 baseload,	 mid-merit	 or	 peak	 power	 plants).	 Further-
more,	hydro	storage	(with	or	without	pumping)	plays	a	major	
role	 in	balancing	the	system,	because	of	 the	flexibility	 it	pro-
vides,	which	 is	 all	 the	more	useful	 to	 the	 system	 if	 intermit-
tent	 generation	 is	 to	 be	 integrated.	Hydropower	 also	has	 the	
advantage	of	being	emission-free,	while	generating	electricity.	
Moreover,	considering	its	concentrated	location	in	Europe	-	in	
the	Alps,	the	Pyrenees,	in	Scandinavia,	etc.	-	it	also	significantly	
impacts	 on	 the	 network	 interconnection	 exchanges	 between	
the	European	countries.	
Meanwhile,	 hydropower,	 in	 particular,	 is	 a	 generation	 tech-
nology	 which	 has	 a	 considerable	 effect	 on	 its	 local	 environ-
ment.	It	can	impact	other	water	or	land	uses	(tourism,	agricul-
ture,	aquaculture,	etc.),	or	even	remote	aquatic	life.	It	can	also	
produce	greenhouse	gases	from	the	decomposition	of	specific	
flooded	 land	(up	 to	0.25  tCO2e/	MWh	in	 the	 lifespan	of	 the	
power	plant,	compared	to	1 tCO2e/	MWh	for	a	gas	turbine).	
The	liabilities	of	hydropower	usage	may	be	far-reaching.	There-
fore,	 the	benefits	of	hydropower	 for	 the	 entire	power	 system	
should	 be	 weighed	 against	 its	 potentially	 negative	 environ-
mental	impact.	
This	 arbitrage	 accounts	 for	 the	 in−depth	 public	 controls	
observed	 in	 granting	 the	 rights	 to	 use	 hydropower,	 install	 a	
power	turbine,	and	possibly	build	a	water	reservoir	for	the	pur-
pose	of	energy	storage.
Public	controls	of	the	use	of	hydropower	are	usually	realised	at	
the	national,	regional	or	local	level,	through	regulators	or	local	
authorities.	 This	 multiplicity	 of	 stakeholders	 is	 even	 greater	
at	 a	European	 level,	which	 exposes	 the	huge	disparity	 in	 the	
type	of	rights,	the	way	they	are	attributed	and	maintained,	and	
the	joint	(environmental	or	investment)	obligations	that	these	
rights	 encompass.	This	diversity	may,	 in	 turn,	 create	variable	
incentives	 to	 use	 and	 develop	 hydropower	 facilities	 across	
European	countries	and	regions.	Accordingly,	this	may	lead	to	
serious	distortions	of	 the	national	 energy	markets,	 as	well	 as	
the	European	electricity	market,	as	a	whole.	
Therefore,	 understanding	 and	 grasping	 the	 main	 differ-
ences	 between	 the	 national	 or	 regional	 hydropower	 regimes	
throughout	Europe	is	of	particular	interest.	Still,	the	economic	
literature	 and	 general	 knowledge	 on	 hydropower	 remains	
national	in	scope.	As	of	yet,	no	benchmarking	of	the	different	
European	 hydropower	 regimes	 has	 been	 carried	 out,	 which	
complicates	the	study	of	potential	market	distortions.	Conse-
quently,	we	 address	 this	 deficiency	 by	 comparing	 the	 hydro-
power	 regimes	 of	 the	Western	 European	 countries	 with	 the	
largest	hydropower	capacity	or	potential	capacity,	namely	Aus-
tria,	France,	Germany,	Great	Britain,	 Italy,	Norway,	Portugal,	
Spain,	 Sweden	 and	 Switzerland.	 Except	 for	 Switzerland	 and	
Italy,	 the	 energy	 systems	 in	 these	 countries	 are	 already	 con-
nected	through	a	common	regional	market,	which	accounts	for	
more	than	half	of	the	EU	electricity	generation.	This	common	
market	 is	 expected	 to	 expand	 (through	 the	 coupling	of	 elec-
tricity	power	exchanges)	 in	2015,	and	will	 eventually	 include	
Italy,	Switzerland	and	the	surrounding	countries.	
In	this	document,	we	analyse	and	compare	the	characteristics	
of	 these	 10	 hydropower	 regulatory	 regimes,	 to	 identify	 their	
key	 economic	properties.	We	 then	 study	 the	 action	of	Euro-
pean	institutions,	with	regard	to	hydropower	regimes	and	pos-
sible	distortions,	and	we	open	a	discussion	toward	the	need	for	
more	harmonisation	at	a	Europe-wide	scale.	
A three-faceted framework to study 
hydropower regimes
A	unified	analytical	 framework	 is	needed	 to	describe,	 scruti-
nise	and	compare	national	hydropower	 regimes,	on	an	equal	
basis.	Robust	recommendations	could	not	otherwise	be	formu-
lated	at	a	Europe-wide	scale.	
The	 characteristics	 of	 hydropower	 regimes	 can	 be	 described	
through	three	main	facets:	(i)	the	institutional	enforcement	of	
hydropower	regimes,	(ii)	the	process	of	granting	rights	to	use	
hydropower	and	the	enforcement	of	these	rights,	(iii)	the	joint	
obligations	that	hydropower	operators	must	respect.	
Facet #1 Institutional enforcement
The	 institutional	 enforcement	 of	 hydropower	 regimes	 details	
the	regulation	and	application	of	hydropower	regimes	by	reg-
ulators	 and	 other	 authorities.	 In	 particular,	 it	 considers	 the	
repartition	 of	 various	 stakeholders	 in	 designing	 hydropower	
regimes	 and	granting	 rights	 for	 its	usage.	These	 stakeholders	
can	 be	 varied,	 from	municipalities	 or	 regulatory	 authorities,	
through	to	environmental	authorities	and	national	or	regional	
governments.	Studying	the	differences	between	each	regime,	at	
that	level,	gives	clear	indications	of	the	degree	of	heterogeneity	
between	regimes.	
The	institutional	 framework	also	describes	 the	type	of	rights,	
authorisations,	 licences,	permits	or	concessions,	which	deter-
mine	the	applicable	set	of	laws	and	regulations	to	hydropower	
usage.	 The	 type	 of	 rights	 might	 have	 an	 economic	 impact	
through	the	relevant	legal	limitations.
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Facet #2 Process of granting rights to use hydropower 
and enforcement of these rights
Another	facet	of	the	hydropower	regime	regards	the	character-
istics	related	to	the	granting	and	enforcement	of	the	rights	to	
use	hydropower.	It	first	regards	the	duration	of	the	right.	The	
different	 local	 or	 national	 public	 authorities	 can	 grant	 it	 for	
variable	durations,	for	one	or	several	decades,	with	more	or	less	
time	for	hydropower	operators	to	pay	back	their	investment.	
These	 rights	 can	 be	 granted	 or	 renewed	 through	negotiation	
between	 the	applicant	and	 the	public	authority,	or	 through	a	
competitive	process.	In	this	regard,	it	will	be	necessary	to	dis-
tinguish,	 among	 the	 European	 countries,	 those	 which	 have	
been	under	the	scrutiny	of	an	infringement	procedure	from	the	
European	Commission	 (or	 the	EFTA2	Surveillance	Authority	
with	respect	to	the	EFTA	States).
Facet #3 Obligations of hydropower operators
The	 last	main	 facet	 of	 hydropower	 regimes	 regards	 the	 joint	
obligations	 that	 hydropower	 right	 holders	 must	 respect.	
Besides	 technological	 specification,	 hydropower	 usage	 rights	
generally	include	strict	environmental,	financial	or	contractual	
conditions,	which	are	associated	with	both	the	environmental	
impact	of	hydropower	plants,	as	well	as	the	strategic	economic	
and	financial	benefits	associated	with	the	technology.	
The	 right	 to	 use	 hydropower	 generally	 specifies	 one,	 or	 sev-
eral,	authorised	types	of	power	plant:	run-of-the-river	(letting	
the	water	flow	without	a	dam),	or	a	reservoir	dam.	It	can	also	
include	criteria	on	size,	waterfall	characteristics	or	the	instal-
lation	of	a	pump	(to	pump	water	downstream	from	the	water-
course	when	the	electricity	price	is	low,	store	it	in	a	reservoir	
and	use	it	when	energy	will	be	more	valuable).
Some	 restrictions	of	use	 (minimum	or	maximum	water	flow	
use)	may	also	be	attached	to	the	usage	right.	These	restrictions	
can	 concern	 the	 share	 of	 water	 utilisation	with	 other	 activi-
ties,	such	as	with	tourism	installations,	fisheries,	or	they	can	be	
based	on	ecological	(fishway,	sediment	flow)	or	security	reasons	
(to	avoid	spilled	water	that	may	create	flooding	downstream).
The	 right	 of	 use	 can	 also	 encompass	 investment	 obligations	
for	 environmental	 protection	 (e.g.,	 fish	 ladders	 -	 to	help	fish	
go	upstream,	-	aerating	turbines	or	multi-layer	intakes	to	avoid	
a	decrease	in	the	temperature	and	oxygen	concentration	in	the	
reservoir,	etc.).	
Most	often,	it	also	includes	the	payment	of	royalties	or	specific	
taxes	(based	on	its	electrical	power,	ground	coverage,	water	use	
2.	 The	European	Free	Trade	Association	 is	 a	 free	 trade	organization	be-
tween	Iceland,	Liechtenstein,	Norway	and	Switzerland	that	operates	in	
parallel	with,	and	is	linked	to,	the	European	Union.
or	the	amount	of	electricity	produced	or	stored,	the	generated	
revenues,	etc.).	These	conditions	are	based	on	the	objective	of	
national	 and	 local	 authorities	 to	 share	 the	 (often	 significant)	
rent	of	hydropower	use	with	the	rest	of	the	region	or	country.	
Diversity of national hydropower regimes
In	this	section,	without	being	exhaustive,	we	present,	in	5	fig-
ures,	some	characteristics	that	make	the	hydropower	regimes	
of	the	10	studied	European	countries	(namely	Austria,	France,	
Germany,	Great	Britain,	Italy,	Norway,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden	
and	Switzerland,)	very	singular.	
Figure	1	presents	 the	degree	 to	which	hydropower	 rights	are	
granted	by	local	or	regional	authorities,	depending	on	the	size	
of	the	power	plant.
Figure	1.	Decision-making	power	of	local	authorities	
One	 can	 observe	 the	 wide	 range	 of	 decision-making	 power	
for	 local	 authorities.	 In	 some	countries,	 like	Great	Britain	or	
Norway,	 all	 rights	 are	 granted	 by	 a	 single	 national	 authority,	
whatever	the	location	or	size	of	the	hydropower	plant.	In	other	
countries,	 such	 as	 Portugal,	 Italy,	 Switzerland,	 Germany	 or	
Sweden,	the	rights	to	use	hydropower	are	granted	by	regional	or	
even	local	authorities.	This	may	add	local	diversity	to	national	
differences	on	the	method	of	granting	the	right	to	use	hydro-
power,	and	their	associated	obligations.
Figures	2	and	3	focus	on	the	specification	of	the	rights	to	use	
hydropower.	Figure	2	presents	the	various	types	of	usage	rights	
(authorisation,	concession,	licence,	and	permit)	and	their	dura-
tion,	which	goes	from	12	years	 in	Great	Britain	(with,	never-
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theless,	the	possibility	of	infinite	renewal),	to	up	to	80	years	in	
Switzerland,	with	 the	most	 extreme	 case	being	Sweden,	with	
no	time	limit.	
If	 the	economic	 impact	of	observing	different	 types	of	 rights	
to	use	hydropower	is	unclear,	the	variability	of	its	duration	has	
two	main	implications.	First	of	all,	the	incentive	for	investment	
is	all	the	more	powerful	if	the	duration	of	the	right	is	long,	as	
hydropower	operators	are	then	able	to	cover	their	investment	
costs	 over	 a	 longer	 period.	 A	 compensation	 scheme	 could	
otherwise	 be	 planned,	 and	 correctly	 valued,	 at	 the	 termina-
tion	of	 the	 right,	 to	achieve	 the	 same	 incentive	effect.	Mean-
while,	a	longer	right	duration	reduces	competition	for	hydro-
power	access,	which	means	the	opportunity	for	potential	new	
entrants	 arises	 less	 frequently.	 Different	 duration	 times	 thus	
imply	 different	 investment	 incentives,	 and	 opportunities	 for	
new	entrants	to	challenge	incumbents.	
Figure	2.	Forms	of	the	rights	to	use	hydropower
Figure	3	represents	an	overview	of	the	environmental	obliga-
tions,	 provided	 by	 the	 different	 hydropower	 regimes,	 with	
details	 on	 the	 various	 thresholds	 and	 areas	 where	 environ-
mental	impact	assessment	is	required,	and	the	necessary	min-
imum	residual	flow.	An	environmental	impact	assessment	can	
be	mandatory	 for	 all	 power	plants	 (as	 in	 Sweden)	 or	 for	 the	
biggest	ones	(as	in	Norway,	Austria,	Italy	and	Portugal).	It	can	
also	 only	 be	 applied	 in	 environmentally	 sensitive	 areas,	 and	
when	the	effects	on	health	and	the	environment	are	most	likely	
(in	Great	Britain,	France	and	Italy).	Minimum	residual	flows	
are	also	very	variable	from	one	country	to	another,	from	non-
zero	in	Germany,	or	5%	in	Great	Britain,	to	more	than	12	%	in	
France.	
From	an	economic	point	of	view,	such	differences	in	the	envi-
ronmental	 impact	assessment	and	residual	flow	requirements	
can	 lead	 to	 differences	 in	 investment	 costs	 for	 hydropower	
facilities,	other	things	being	equal.	Indeed,	the	environmental	
obligations	 imply	either	an	 increase	 in	 investment	costs	 for	a	
maximal	exploitation	of	hydropower	potential,	or	a	reduction	
of	 the	plant	capacity.	Given	the	economies	of	scale	of	hydro-
power	 facilities,	 such	 a	 solution	 would	 lead	 to	 lower	 profit-
ability	of	the	plant.	
Figure	3.	Environmental	impact	assessment	and	residual	flow	
obligations
Figure	4	 illustrates	whether	 the	rights	 to	use	hydropower	are	
attributed	or	renewed	through	a	competitive	process.	
France,	Spain	and	Italy	currently	grant	or	renew	the	right	to	use	
hydropower	through	a	competitive	process.	Great	Britain	does	
the	same	for	 licences	granted	after	2003,	 the	 licences	granted	
before	2003	having	no	 time	 limit.	A	 competition	process	 for	
new	power	plants	only	is	implemented	in	Portugal	and	Switzer-
land.	The	other	studied	countries,	Norway,	Sweden,	Germany	
and	Austria,	had	not	implemented	any	competitive	process	to	
grant	the	right	to	use	hydropower,	until	recently.	Obviously,	the	
implementation	of	a	competitive	process	to	grant	or	renew	the	
right	to	use	hydropower	gives	opportunities	for	new	entrants	to	
access	this	resource	and	these	national	markets.	
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Figure	4.	Process	of	competition	to	grant	the	right	to	use	
hydropower
It	must	be	noted	that	the	way	these	rights	are	attributed	evolved	
some	 years	 ago	 in	 France,	 Italy	 and	 Spain,	 after	 they	 were	
targeted	 by	 infringement	 procedures	 from	 the	 DG	 internal	
market	and	services	 (see	figure	5).	Two	 further	 infringement	
procedures	were	 also	 recently	 initiated	by	different	Director-
ates-	General.	The	DG	Competition	has	opened	a	State	aid	pro-
cedure	 in	Portugal,	questioning	the	price	paid	by	the	 incum-
bent	to	extend	the	duration	of	its	concession	rights.	And,	the	
DG	Environment	opened	an	infringement	procedure	in	Aus-
tria	 for	not	 respecting	 the	water	directive	 in	planning	 a	new	
hydropower	plant.
An	 infringement	procedure	was	also	opened	against	Norway	
by	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	(ESA),	in	20023.	This	was	
due	to	discrimination	between	public	and	private	companies,	
as	the	latter	were	not	compensated	at	the	termination	of	their	
right	 to	use	hydropower,	while	 retroceding	 their	 asset	 to	 the	
pubic	 authority.	The	 ESA	 decision	 of	 2007	 allowed	 Norway	
the	right	to	legitimately	pursue	the	objective	of	establishing	a	
system	of	public	ownership	of	all	expiring	rights.	There	has	not	
been	any	major	change	in	the	other	countries.	
3.	 EFTA	 Court	 (2007),	 Case	 E-2/06,	 EFTA	 Surveillance	
Authority	 v.	 The	 Kingdom	 of	 Norway,	 Judgment	 of	 the	 Court:	
Conditions	 for	 concession	 acquisition	 of	 hydropower	 resources,	
h t t p : / / w w w . e f t a c o u r t . i n t / u p l o a d s / t x _ n v c a s e s /	
2_06_Judgment_EN.pdf
Figure	5.	Several	countries	have	been	subject	to	an	
infringement	procedure
Possible distortion of the European 
electricity market
The	 differences	 in	 hydropower	 rights	 regimes,	 observed	 in	
Western	European	countries,	are	currently	not	established	on	
an	equal	basis.	Rather,	they	are	decided	by	the	national	or	local	
authorities	 themselves.	The	 specification	 of	 each	 national	 or	
local	 regime,	 the	obligations	 faced	by	hydropower	operators,	
and	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 granting	 process	 (competitive	
or	 not)	 present	 no	 uniformity	 in	 any	 scope	 greater	 than	 the	
national	level.	Some	of	these	differences	could	be	justified	from	
an	economic	point	of	view,	e.g.	those	based	on	environmental	
specification.	Nevertheless,	 it	 is	not	now	possible	to	conclude	
whether	 the	 apparent	 differences	 are	 justified	 from	 an	 eco-
nomic	point	of	view,	and	thus	consider	whether	they	introduce	
competition	distortion.	
These	distortions	can	impact	investment	conditions	or	use	of	
the	power	plant.	Other	things	being	equal,	it	is	obvious	that	if	
one	country	provides	better	or	worse	conditions	for	investment	
and	use	of	hydropower	(through	more	or	less	obligations,	taxa-
tion	or	competition),	it	will	impact	investment	and	the	use	of	
hydropower.	This	then	distorts	the	national	power	equilibrium,	
the	electricity	price	in	each	country,	and	the	electricity	flow	pat-
tern	through	the	power	grid,	compared	to	a	situation	in	which	
the	national	hydropower	regimes	would	be	built	according	to	a	
common	methodology.4
4.	 Even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 illustrated	 here,	 diversity	 of	 taxation	 is	 also	 important,	
which	introduces	additional	distortion	to	the	European	electricity	market.	
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Lack of clarity from the different DGs, 
and the need for greater harmonisation of 
hydropower regimes
Lacking	a	robust	analysis	of	 the	right	 to	use	hydropower,	 the	
European	 Commission	 has	 chosen	 a	 case-by-case	 approach.	
The	infringement	procedures	it	opened	follow	this	logic.	Each	
DG	 acts	 independently	 on	 infringement	 cases,	 with	 its	 own	
objectives,	and	different,	uncoordinated	tools.	Fortunately,	no	
country	was	simultaneously	targeted	for	its	hydropower	regime	
by	multiple	 DGs.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 seems	 surprising	 that	 DG	
Competition	has	 targeted	Portugal	 for	 state	aid,	but	 that	DG	
Internal	Market	and	Services	has	raised	no	question	about	the	
absence	of	a	competitive	process	for	the	renewal	of	rights	to	use	
hydropower.	Similarly,	it	is	remarkable	that	DG	Environment	
has	 opened	 an	 infringement	 procedure	 against	 Austria	 for	
non-compliance	with	the	water	directive	and	that	DG	Internal	
Market	and	Services	has	opened	none,	whereas	no	competitive	
process	has	been	implemented.	Furthermore,	several	decisions	
made	by	the	DG	Internal	Market	and	Services	also	seem	to	lack	
uniformity.	While	the	EC	reopened	an	infringement	procedure	
against	Italy,	due	to	a	newly	added	delay	to	the	Italian	law	on	
opening	the	hydropower	market,	other	countries	like	Austria,	
Germany	 or	 Sweden	 have	 not	 been	 concerned,	 despite	 the	
rights	to	use	hydropower	being	granted	without	any	competi-
tive	procedures,	sometimes	for	extensive	periods	(see	box	1).	
These	examples	show	the	regrettable	lack	of	coordination	and	
consistency	of	the	European	Commission,	which	may	lead	to	
additional	 and	 contradictory	 distortions	 of	 competition,	 and	
make	it	more	difficult	to	open	competition	for	hydropower	in	
new	countries.	
Rather	than	doing	a	case-by-case	approach,	it	may	be	more	effi-
cient	 for	 the	European	Commission	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 complete	
and	thorough	analysis,	and	work	on	economic	recommenda-
tions	for	designing	and	granting	the	rights	to	use	hydropower.	
The	work	of	the	various	DGs	on	the	hydropower	regime	should	
be	coordinated	and	uniform	in	their	tools	and	approach.	
At	a	more	global	level,	the	goals	of	the	Commission	and	its	DGs	
should	 tend	 toward	more	harmonised	regulatory	regimes	 for	
hydropower.	The	analysis	of	the	European	national	regimes	has	
exposed	serious	issues	that	go	beyond	the	variability	of	com-
petition	procedures.	The	many	differences	observed	from	one	
national	or	 regional	 regime	 to	another	exacerbate	 the	distor-
tions	of	 competition	between	Member	States,	 and	 jeopardise	
the	 achievements	 of	 the	 common	 energy	 market.	 New	 and	
harmonised	rules	regarding	the	implementation	of	rights	and	
joint	obligations	are	an	urgent	matter	that	the	EC	should	treat	
alongside	its	efforts	to	develop	and	regularise	the	competitive	
processes	for	hydropower	rights.
Box	1	National	situations	versus	currently	engaged	procedures	for	competitive	infringement
Countries 
Type of right to 
use hydropower 
Evaluation of granting procedure Currently engaged 
procedure for competition 
infringement? Duration 
Competitive 
process? 
Austria Authorization l l No 
France 
Concession > 4.5 
MW 
l l No 
Germany Permit l l No 
Great Britain Licence 
l (before 2003) 
l (after 2003) 
l (before 2003) 
l (after 2003) No 
Italy Concession l l Yes 
Norway Licence > 1 MW l l No 
Portugal Concession l l Yes 
Spain Concession l l No 
Sweden Concession l l No 
Switzerland Concession l l No 
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